Citizenship as Capital: The Distinction of Migrant Labor

Harald Bauder*

As subordinate workers, migrants and foreigners are an essential labor force for industrialized economies. The author extends Pierre Bourdieu’s ideas of capital to suggest that citizenship constitutes a key mechanism of distinction between migrant and nonmigrant workers. From this perspective, citizenship is a strategically produced form of capital, which manifests itself in formal (legal and institutional) as well as informal (practiced and cultural) aspects. Both aspects of citizenship can render migrant labor more vulnerable than nonmigrant labor and often channel migrants into the secondary labor market or the informal economy. The author presents examples from Germany and Canada to illustrate how legal and cultural processes associated with citizenship facilitate economic subordination and exploitation of migrant labor. The value of conceptualizing citizenship as a form of capital lies in integrating processes of inclusion and exclusion into a framework of distinction and in locating the strategic nature of citizenship with the motivation of reproduction. Based on the situation of migrants in the labor market, the author proposes that the logic of distinction and reproduction is an important underlying force in the construction and transformation of the concept of citizenship.

KEYWORDS: citizenship, migration, labor, capital, distinction

What was the case for the ancient and medieval plebs, for the third estate, for workers, for women, and what is not ended, is every bit as much the case today for foreigners—more precisely, for the quite particular foreigners who, even as they are “from

*Until December 31, 2008, Department of Geography, University of Guelph, Guelph, ON N1G 2W1, Canada. E-mail: hbauder@uoguelph.ca. After January 1, 2009, Department of Geography, Ryerson University, 350 Victoria Street, Toronto ON M5B 2K3.
elsewhere,” are also completely “from here.” Immigrants, today’s proletarians.

—Étienne Balibar

Industrialized economies have become structurally dependent on the availability and continual supply of migrants labor. In this article, I draw on Pierre Bourdieu’s ideas of capital to argue that citizenship functions as a key mechanism of distinction that renders migrants vulnerable and exploitable, and therefore particularly valuable to the economies of the global North. Citizenship as a culturally produced category manifests itself in formal (legal and institutional) as well as informal (practiced and cultural) forms. I suggest that both aspects of citizenship function as a form of capital and a mechanism of distinction.

This view of citizenship corresponds to the treatment of citizenship as strategic concept not only in association with constructions of identity and belonging, struggles over recognition, and the politics of participation and contribution, but also in relation to regulating access to scarce resources and institutionalizing difference. In this article, I develop a perspective of citizenship that integrates processes of inclusion and exclusion under the logic of distinction and reproduction.

As a form of capital, citizenship serves as a strategy of accumulation that is deliberately deployed and can be exchanged into other forms of capital. But rather than constituting an overarching cultural logic of capitalism, citizenship, as I develop it here, follows the wider logic of distinction. For Bourdieu, capital is about the reproduction of social order. In this context, social reproduction cannot be neatly separated into contexts of home, work, and politics. The coexistence of interchangeable economic, social, and cultural forms of capital reflects the interlocking nature of processes of production, social practices, and cultural identities in the perpetuation of inequality and the reproduction of capitalist society.

Labor markets are important sites for the reproduction of social order: They operate at the intersection of economic, political, social, and cultural processes, and they are politically, socially and culturally regulated. International migrants serve as an illustrative example of the significance of non-market-driven processes of labor-market regulation through citizenship. Instead of gaining access to occupations that reflect their education and training once they upgrade their language skills—as human capital theory would predict—many migrants categorically lack access to the upper labor-market segments or to the formal labor market altogether. The legal status and cultural meanings associated with citizenship play a key role in rendering many migrants into a labor force that is particularly vulnerable.
and exploitable. In industrialized countries, citizenship is an ordering principle of labor markets.

The view of citizenship as a form of capital offers not only valuable insights into the concrete labor-market segmentation of international migrants but also permits integrating political, cultural, and geographical processes of inclusion and exclusion into a conceptual framework that locates the strategic nature of citizenship with the motivations of distinction and reproduction. Although citizenship is a historically and politically constructed concept that changes over time and space, the process of distinction and reproduction may constitute an underlying logic of its construction and transformation. Such a perspective of citizenship resonates with Étienne Balibar’s words quoted in the epigraph above, which highlight the discrepancy between immigrants’ material struggles as “today’s proletarians” and their being “from elsewhere” in respect to laying abstract claims to citizenship.

The remainder of this article is divided into three sections. First, I discuss the concepts of capital and distinction with particular reference to migrant labor. Second, I develop the notion of citizenship as a form of capital and a mechanism of labor regulation. By presenting evidence from Canada, a traditional immigration country, and Germany, a country that until recently held to policies of being a nonimmigrant country, I illustrate the international and transcontinental relevance of the idea of citizenship as capital. Third, I conclude by addressing some implications regarding contemporary perspectives of citizenship and geographical scale that emerge from this discussion.

**Capital and Distinction**

The notion of capital assumes variable meanings throughout the social sciences. Orthodox economists tend to emphasize the economic and monetary forms of capital, but they also speak of, for example, human capital, referring to the educational and skill characteristics of labor. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels offered other interpretations of capital, including estate capital, associated with landholdings, and variable capital, referring to labor. Bourdieu also endorsed this multidimensional character of capital. He identified various “species of capital” in his writing, including political, military, scientific, and technological capital, symbolic capital, and cultural capital, which he further subdivided into objectified, embodied, and institutionalized cultural capital. Expanding the definition of capital from its purely monetary form to include the social and the cultural, permits an integrated perspective of society and
the processes of production. While Marx, however, saw the concept of capital primarily as a “means of exploitation and domination,” Bourdieu emphasized the role of capital in the reproduction of society.

The various complementary forms of capital coexist, and people and social groups who possess the necessary “competence” can transfer resources from one form of capital to another to achieve distinction and reproduction. This perspective of capital stresses human agency. Individuals and social groups do not simply respond to market forces but, rather, strategically create, valorize, and endorse different forms of capital. Capital is a way to actively construct difference and express distinction. People who possess it use it to distinguish themselves from nonowners and thereby elevate their status and congeal their privilege, while people who lack access to it can be excluded and subordinated.

For example, based on empirical work on the practices of distinction in France, Bourdieu suggests that the members of an elite social group may signify their status through embodied cultural capital in the form of subtle “gestures or the apparently most insignificant techniques of the body—ways of walking or blowing one’s nose, ways of eating or talking.” In this case, people who do not possess the code to read or enact these cultural performances lack access to important symbols of status. Another process of distinction exists in the form of institutionalized cultural capital represented by educational diplomas, certificates, or other types of institutional acknowledgment. In France, prior to World War II, access to prestigious educational institutions was restricted to the social elite, which used these exclusive institutional credentials to acquire privileged employment and thereby reproduce its social standing. In this case, social reproduction occurred through the link between economic and institutional cultural capital.

Such constructions and expressions of capital regulate labor markets. For example, gender performances inscribed onto workers’ bodies shape workplace expectations and career trajectories in occupations as diverse as corporate banking and shop-floor manufacturing. In the cases of migrants, lack of access to embodied cultural capital that is expected by employers can lead to the denial of job opportunities in professional occupations. Similarly, the nonrecognition of foreign credentials often constitutes a barrier for international migrants to gain access to professional jobs. Licensing bodies and government regulators may seek to protect well-paying and prestigious jobs by mobilizing institutional cultural capital that is inaccessible to migrants. Unable to practice in their occupations of training, migrants often take low-status, manual, or informal jobs.
as janitors, maids, restaurant helpers, or other employment at the margins of the labor market.

In addition, migration and settlement researchers have produced an extensive body of work on the notion of social capital. Although the term \textit{social capital} is sometimes applied to describe networks that function as mere self-help and survival strategies, it also refers to “distinctive sociocultural resources,” a definition that is more in line with Bourdieu’s use of the term \textit{capital}. While such resources can be used to strategically exclude migrants from networks that facilitate entry into professional and managerial employment, they can also create opportunities in ethnic and immigrant economies, which tend to offer jobs in the low-skill and low-wage sectors of the job market.

The attractiveness of Bourdieu’s approach to explain the labor-market situation of migrants lies in the geographical nature of the production of capital. Systems of creating, valorizing, and exchanging capital are place-contingent: in different places different systems exist. For example, similar social practices—such as withdrawing from the labor market and the ability to “idle,”—signify social status in some places, such as rural areas of India, but symbolize social pathology in the capitalist market economies of the global North. Such geographical differences affect migrants who move between places and who, as a result, often experience social dislocation. In addition, the nonmigrant population may strategically create and invest in forms of capital that are inaccessible to migrants for the very purpose of distinction between the migrant population and itself. Citizenship, I will show in the next section, is a particularly powerful place-bound mechanism of distinction that facilitates the exclusion of migrants and the subordination of their labor.

\section*{Citizenship as Capital}

Citizenship is a mechanism of distinction between migrants and non-migrants based on associations with place, origin, and national community. It is important to recognize at this point that the definition of migrant and “citizen” may overlap, but they are not synonymous. The work by Yasmine Soysal on migrants in Berlin, for example, illustrates that migrants can acquire “postnational” citizenship rights, enabling them to “participate in Berlin’s public institutions and make claims to its authority structures” without carrying a German passport. In fact, naturalization rates are relatively low among Turkish residents in Germany, who would jeopardize their Turkish citizenship with the acquisition of the German passport. Conversely,
people who have never moved, such as many of the children of these Turkish migrants in Germany, still do not possess unconditional legal citizenship status. Nevertheless, the association between citizenship and geographical territory enables the distinction and exclusion of large numbers and proportions of migrants who cross from one territory to another. The lack of citizenship defines some migrants as legal and cultural outsiders. Below, I discuss formal and informal aspects of citizenship as a mechanism of legal and cultural distinction and exclusion. I am particularly interested in the manner in which these two aspects facilitate the reproduction of labor-market privilege.

**Formal Citizenship**

Formal citizenship is a legal category that is strategically created, endorsed, and valorized by the collective membership of a national community or the political elites that claim to represent them. The rules that guide formal citizenship cater to the particular historical context, political agendas, and economic needs of nation-states. For example, territorial (*jus soli*) and origin (*jus sanguinis*) principles of citizenship emphasize either birthplace or ancestry as criteria for membership. In immigration countries, such as Canada, which have historically depended on the influx of newcomers to sustain territorial expansion, demographic growth, and economic development, the *jus soli* principle and a regular naturalization process have granted formal citizenship privileges to first- and second-generation immigrants. For political and historical reasons, Germany has traditionally endorsed the *jus sanguinis* principle of citizenship. While ethnic German migrants, so-called *Aussiedler* and *Spätaussiedler*, could be absent from German territory for generations and centuries and were still recognized as German citizens, the children of German-born foreign “guest” workers who lived in Germany for decades did not, until recently, automatically obtain German citizenship. Due to changing political and social circumstances, Germany’s citizenship law was recently modified. The new law, which took effect on January 1, 2000, now incorporates elements of the territorial principle, although children born to parents of foreign nationality with permanent residence in Germany are still required to choose between German and foreign citizenships by the time they reach early adulthood. Most countries pursue a combination of *jus soli*, *jus sanguinis*, and naturalization practices, depending on strategic objectives to include and exclude population groups.

Not only the members of a national community use citizenship as a tool of collective inclusion and exclusion, but also individuals and
families acquire and deploy formal citizenship strategically for purposes of distinction, reproduction, and accumulation. For example, wealthy East Asian families have used Canadian immigration policy—in particular the Business Immigration Program—to obtain immigrant status and subsequently citizenship in exchange for economic capital investments of 400,000 Canadian dollars in Canadian businesses or the establishment of a new business in Canada.\textsuperscript{41} The possession of multiple passports can, in turn, be converted into other forms of capital, including monetary capital through expanded possibilities for international business transactions, social capital through establishing multinational personal and professional contacts and communities, and cultural capital through the acquisition of language capacity, education, and professional credentials.\textsuperscript{42} The phenomenon of cross-Pacific commuting—whereby business people shuttle back and forth between their enterprises in Hong Kong or Taipei and their families’ homes in Vancouver—attests to the strategic character of formal citizenship acquisition. These arrangements are usually set up before immigration and rarely reflect a pure survival strategy after business failure in Canada.\textsuperscript{43} Formal citizenship, in this case, functions as a form of capital in the sense intended by Bourdieu. It is a strategically deployed category that can be exchanged with other forms of capital and serves the aim of accumulation and reproduction.

The strategies of citizenship pursued by individuals or families and national communities often pursue different objectives. For example, over the last decades many Lebanese refugees have acquired Canadian citizenship because it carries value by enabling mobility and providing political security when the family returns to Lebanon. Such a strategic use of citizenship, however, was never intended by the Canadian state. Accordingly, public outcry was large when the Canadian government evacuated fifteen thousand Lebanese Canadians from Lebanon in the wake of the 2006 Israeli invasion. Critics alleged that these citizens, many of whom were naturalized immigrants, “want all the benefits of being Canadian, but none of the burden” and suggested that citizenship policy be reviewed to better “serve Canada’s interests.”\textsuperscript{44} This public debate arose because migrants and the collective national community—represented by the Canadian state—pursue their own strategic interests and agendas of reproduction as they assume and grant formal citizenship. In this case, the cost of evacuating thousands of citizens from Lebanon was not matched by the perceived economic benefits to Canada created when these migrants became Canadian citizens.

In the context of setting economic agendas, national communities use citizenship to extend or withdraw economic rights\textsuperscript{45} and to “cheapen the labour power”\textsuperscript{46} of migrant workers. Citizens usually
have unconstrained access to the national labor market and enjoy social and economic rights. For many noncitizens, labor-market access is either denied or conditional on permits, special legal status, or international agreements. Although migrants in Canada and Germany acquire postnational economic rights with permanent residency and employment history, as noncitizens they are not entitled to these rights prior to migration but need to acquire them in the first place. In the sense that formal citizenship permits the denial of economic rights, formal citizenship (or lack thereof) is a legal mechanism of labor-market inclusion and exclusion.

When noncitizens receive only conditional labor-market access, the lack of formal citizenship often functions as a mechanism of subordination. In Germany, foreigners are given hierarchical access to the labor market depending on their nationality. Citizens of EU countries enjoy similar formal access to German citizens in most occupations. Non-European nationals are at the bottom of the pecking order and face considerable constraints to obtain residency and employment permits. They depend on attaining residency and work permits to gain probationary access to employment. One way to work as a foreigner without employment history in Germany is to invest 50,000 euros and create at least five new jobs. Highly skilled foreign workers need a job offer that pays at least 63,000 euros. Turkish citizens occupy an intermediate position based on a treaty negotiated between Turkey and the European Union. The so-called priority regulation (Vorrangregelung) ranks foreigners without employment history in Germany according to their passports. The alternative to unattainable work in the formal labor market is employment in the informal sector, where wages are low, abuse is rampant, and employers make no contributions to health, employment, and social insurances.

Likewise, in Canada citizenship subordinates workers who are formally “classified as non-citizens.” Nonstatus immigrants are particularly vulnerable as workers who “are denied basic social and health services,” although many of them pay taxes. If the lack of status denies work in the formal economy, many migrants are pushed into the informal economy, where labor standards are not formally controlled.

Labor-market institutions tend to reproduce distinctions based on citizenship. For example, the nonrecognition of foreign credentials is a common barrier to employment of migrants in high-skill occupations. In Germany, however, the assessment of foreign occupational and educational credentials is contingent on citizenship. Migrants of German origin are legally entitled to accreditation, while non-German migrants are not. This creates the bizarre
situation that migrants with similar education and credentials from the same foreign educational system can be treated differently in the assessment of their credentials. For example, Spätaussiedler are German citizens and entitled to the accreditation of their Soviet degrees; the employment agency (Agentur für Arbeit) can refer them into skilled employment matching their training. Other foreigners, including Jewish contingent refugees (Kontingentflüchtlinge), who received similar Soviet degrees as Spätaussiedler, are not entitled to accreditation. Subsequently, the employment agency is often unable to place them into jobs at their skill levels but only into employment below their skills and often in the secondary segment of the labor market.\textsuperscript{55}

The use of formal citizenship as a mechanism of distinction and the subordination of labor is particularly apparent in the context of temporary foreign labor. Germany has a long history of maintaining a workforce of noncitizens who cannot freely choose employers or occupations, are paid below German wage standards, and do not receive the regular social and economic benefits granted to German workers.\textsuperscript{56} Today these workers are represented in the status categories of seasonal worker (Saisonarbeitnehmer), foreign contract worker (Werksvertragsarbeiter), and nonseasonal “guest” worker (Gastarbeiter), which represented 295,190, 18,462, and 962 workers, respectively, between January and November 2007.\textsuperscript{57} Likewise, Canada issued 165,198 permits to noncitizen migrant workers in 2007 under its Temporary Foreign Worker programs.\textsuperscript{58} Severely restricted circumstances deny these workers the choice of employer or occupation and effectively render them “unfree labour.”\textsuperscript{59} New regulations have increased the period these workers are available to Canadian employers (from one year to two years) and signify the intention to expand, rather than reduce, this vulnerable labor force of noncitizens.\textsuperscript{60} The lack of formal citizenship relegates these migrant workers to the lowest segments of the labor market and ensures that nonmigrants obtain privileged access to upper-labor-market segments. It distinguishes migrants from nonmigrants and reproduces economic privilege.

\textit{Informal Citizenship}

Informal citizenship is a dimension of membership in a national community related to practices of identity and belonging. This substantive dimension of citizenship complements formal citizenship as a mechanism of distinction and applies to migrants who “are not considered ‘to belong’ to the nation state community, even if formally they are entitled to.”\textsuperscript{61} This dimension of citizenship affects
the labor-market situation of many migrants and reproduces the economic privileges of nonmigrants.

Although migrants and nonmigrants often share a range of common principles of social and economic participation, they are not on equal footing in the labor market. For example, although the foreign permanent residents with Turkish citizenship in Berlin, Germany, have acquired postnational rights, these rights do not equate with social and economic inclusion. The Turkish population of Berlin and other German cities has continued to experience major disadvantages in the labor market. Their unemployment rates are soaring compared with that of the German population, and those workers who do have jobs typically bring home earnings far below the national and local averages. Research involving German youth in Berlin indicates that popular constructions of citizenship continue to hinge on notions of origin, birthplace, and “culture.” This research rejects “the notion that national citizenship is declining in importance in favour of post-national forms of citizenship.” Constructions of identity and practices of distinction associated with informal citizenship help produce and reproduce labor market inequality.

Informal citizenship cannot be entirely separated from “race.” In fact, racial markers often signify cultural nonbelonging. When “racial” markers are measured, statistics indicate that persons belonging to “racial” minority groups suffer from labor-market disadvantages, independent of formal citizenship. However, the idea of informal citizenship as a category of distinction and exclusion can be applied in a more territorial manner than the category of race. In some places in Canada, so-called visible minorities are increasingly represented as belonging. For example, cities such as Toronto and Vancouver, assume a distinctly “multicultural” identity. In this case, a person’s belonging may not be defined so much by “racial” markers as by having access to territorially defined cultural codes and conventions and by being able to enact place-particular habitual performances. My use of the term informal citizenship captures this territorial idea of belonging.

This idea of informal citizenship defines cultural membership in national communities. These communities are “imagined” because members do not personally know each other and therefore produce collective systems of identity and difference. National communities and their boundaries are creations of cultural and political processes of inclusion and exclusion and distinction between “us and them,” citizens and noncitizens. Nonmigrants often express identities of belonging through citizenship. Among working-class youths in Berlin, for example, citizenship as a sense of belonging
reflects what Bourdieu calls “habitus,” expressed through a commitment to “German cultural norms” and attitudes. This commitment correlates with the entitlement of citizens to the social, cultural, and economic resources controlled by the national community. The commitment to imagined national behavioral norms, attitudes, and cultural conventions distinguishes citizens from those migrants who are unable to express belonging in this way and who can therefore be denied entitlement to these resources.

Throughout the global North, and particularly in Europe, the demand of immigrants to express their loyalty to the nation-state, to embrace the cultural identity of their country of settlement and demonstrate their willingness to adapt to an imagined national habitus and associated national “values,” have been on the rise, rather than in decline. In Canada and Germany, the acquisition of formal citizenship hinges on the internalization of some of these informal markers of citizenship, such as the ability to speak English/French or German, or, in the case of Canada, the successful completion of a citizenship test that demands knowledge of national history, geography, and “Canadian values.” Through this implication in formal citizenship, informal citizenship links back to the formal processes of distinction and labor-market exclusion described in the preceding section.

Informal citizenship distinctions associated with belonging and entitlement also shape the labor-market situation of migrants in a more direct manner. For example, migrants are often unable to give the cultural performances expected from the members of an imagined national community. They may speak with an accent rather than “proper” standardized language or accepted national dialect or they project embodied images or institutionalized symbols of non-belonging. The judgments of such performances of nonbelonging can motivate, for example, staff in Canadian employment and settlement agencies to place South Asian immigrants into occupations at the lower end of the job market, with more prestigious and better paying positions being reserved for workers who project the images of national belonging. In fact, that these markers of unbelonging often facilitate and legitimate employment in multicultural institutions and settlement agencies illustrates the currency that these markers possess in the context of occupational inclusion and exclusion.

Media reporting reflect such processes of distinction associated with informal citizenship. For example, seasonal agricultural work in Canada is seen as too dangerous, physically strenuous, and demeaning for Canadian workers, but not for foreign migrant workers from Mexico and the Caribbean. Popular media narratives mobilize the
category of citizenship to create a double standard that distinguishes between the nonmigrants, who are entitled to certain labor standards and social and economic protection, and migrants, who can be denied these entitlements. This double standard became particularly apparent in 1999 when the media discussed a proposal by the government of the province of Ontario to replace seasonal “offshore” workers with Canadian unemployed welfare recipients. This proposal met fierce opposition in the press. Newspaper reports lamented that Canadian workers would not learn any valuable skills through farm labor, compared this proposal with forced-labor camps, and complained that the harvesting jobs were too strenuous, dangerous, and low-paying to be acceptable to Canadians.

The voices of Canadian labor advocates and civil-rights activists opposed the infringement on the economic and social entitlements of fellow citizens. However, neither the newspapers nor the labor advocates expressed the same degree of solidarity with foreign migrant workers. The lack of access to the identity and entitlements associated with citizenship apparently devalues the labor of noncitizens, legitimating their exploitation.

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In the above discussion, I have illustrated how citizenship can function as a form of capital. Formal citizenship implicates legal and institutional processes; informal citizenship involves cultural practices and constructions of identities. Both of these aspects of citizenship reflect processes and practices of inclusion and exclusion that Bourdieu associates with the concept of capital and that follow the logic of distinction and reproduction. Informal citizenship can even be converted into formal citizenship through the requirement of cultural citizenship competencies as a condition for naturalization.

In the national labor market, formal and informal aspects of citizenship can further be translated into economic and other forms of capital. In this context, of course, citizenship is not independent from class, race, gender, and other categories of distinction. Rather, it constitutes one element in a complex system of globally, nationally, and locally interlocking processes of reproduction. To explore these linkages in greater detail is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this article.

Conceiving of citizenship as capital and a mechanism of distinction and reproduction contributes to an explanation of why “European countries have been reluctant to give citizenship status to migrants” and why immigrant countries, such as Canada, maintain a “permanent” workforce of temporary foreign workers. As
politically and culturally excluded noncitizens, many migrants do not compete on a level playing field for the resources of the welfare state. By denying these migrants citizenship rights and access to a shared identity, national communities and their nation-states ensure that these migrant workers remain in positions in which they are vulnerable and contribute disproportionately to the economies of industrialized countries. In the context of the regulation of labor markets, citizenship is a strategy for the accumulation of monetary capital.

At a global scale, citizenship as a form of capital helps reproduce the economic privilege of the North. People of the global South are important to the societies and economies of the global North as excluded noncitizens and exploitable migrant labor. Distinction based on a discourse of race, I think, is practically untenable in the contemporary political climate. Rather, territorial distinction based on the sterile category of citizenship is a more appealing and less contested mechanism to create a proletariat of migrants in today’s world.

By integrating citizenship into Bourdieu’s larger framework of capital, the strategic nature of citizenship can be located with motivations of distinction and reproduction. The idea that the vulnerability of many migrants and their sometimes appalling employment situations are the inevitable outcome of self-regulating labor markets and side-effects of globalization must be rejected. Rather, their vulnerability and labor-market circumstances are strategically produced through the deployment and denial of formal and informal citizenship.

This perspective of citizenship as a form of capital paints a rather pessimistic picture of the potential of migrants exercising their agency and subverting meanings and practices of citizenship to their benefit. Powerful social, economic, and political elites continuously redefine the contents and value of variable forms of capital before underprivileged groups figure out how to obtain it. Unfortunately for migrants, this principle may apply to both formal and informal aspects of citizenship. Not only legal bodies but also “ordinary” citizens “imagine and re-imagine” citizenship in a variety of ways and thereby articulate ever-changing systems of distinction and exclusion. Recognizing the underlying motivations of distinction and reproduction, however, is a critical step toward improving the economic and political situation of migrants.

The underlying motivations of distinction and reproduction affirm the material basis of the construction of citizenship. With material change, the concept of citizenship is also likely to transform. For example, citizenship as a mechanism of distinction and
reproduction is not necessarily linked to a particular territory or geographical scale. Rather, it can operate at the scale of the nation-state, the body, or can "span geo-political boundaries." In Europe, such a rescaling of formal and informal aspects of citizenship has been under way. The Shengen Agreement has created a new legal framework of inclusion and exclusion, and European institutions have helped to construct new collective identities of unity and difference. This new Fortress Europe, however, "has not eliminated the insider-outsider distinction" but will likely deploy similar processes of exclusion and reproduction through citizenship as traditional national communities and states have deployed in the past.

Notes

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9. É. Balibar, “Propositions on Citizenship,” Ethics 98 (July 1988); Kра
tochwil, note 3; C. Joppke, “History Determines Citizenship Law: Citizen-
ship Without Identity,” Canadian Dimensions 3, no. 2 (2004); M. Momen,
“Are You a Citizen? Insights From Borderlands,” Citizenship Studies 9, no. 3
(2005).

10. É. Balibar, We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citi-
p. 501.

11. Some would argue that even after the introduction of a rather re-
strictive immigration law in 2005, Germany is still a long way from being an
“immigration” country; e.g., M. Hell, Einwanderungsland Deutschland? Die
Zuwanderungsdiskussion, 1998–2002 (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissen-
schaften, 2005); H. Bauder, “Kanada: Zuwanderungsmodell für Deutsch-

12. K. Marx and F. Engels, Die deutsche Ideologie (Berlin: Dietz Verlag,

13. K. Marx, Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. Erstes Buch, Der
Produktionsprozeß des Kapitals; K. Marx, F. Engles: Werke. Band 23, 20 (Au-

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dieu and J-C. Passeron, Reproduction in Education, Society, and Culture (Sage,


17. J. K. Gibson-Graham, The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It): A Fem-


20. Ibid., p. 466.


22. J. Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (Lon-
don: Routledge, 1990); J. Butler, “Performativity’s Social Magic,” in R.

23. L. McDowell, Capital Culture: Gender at Work in the City (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1997); Paul Willis, Learning to Labour: How Working Class Kids Get

24. H. Bauder, “Cultural Representations of Immigrant Workers by
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Migration and Integration 2, no. 3 (2001); H. Bauder, “Brain Abuse,’ or the
Devaluation of Immigrant Labour in Canada,” Antipode 35, no. 4 (2003); E.
Girard and H. Bauder, “Assimilation and Exclusion of Foreign Trained Engi-
neers in Canada: Inside a Canadian Professional Regulatory Organization,”

in Modern Sociology,” Annual Review of Sociology 24 (1998); N. K. Lin, K.


34. Ibid.


36. The mismatch between the categories migrant and “citizen” is further complicated by the recognition of citizenship privileges among migrants, for example, within the European Union.

37. This differentiation between two aspects of citizenship appears in literature also as rights versus practices of belonging (J. Holston and A. Appadurai, eds., *Cities and Citizenship* [Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999]), legal status versus participation and identity (Bloemraad, note 86), status versus belonging (Kratochwil, note 9) or status and rights versus identity (Joppke, note 9), to name just a few examples.


43. Waters, note 42.
47. Soysal, note 33.
49. With a few exceptions; for example, in public administration, police, or military, as well as citizens of eight “new” European Union member states, who, based on the so-called 2+3+2 regulation, will likely not receive equal access until 2011. Recently, the German government announced that electrical and mechanical engineers from these “new” member states will receive privileged access to the German labor market; see Markus Engler, “Bundesregierung erleichtert Zuzug von Ingenieuren aus Osteuropa,” Migration und Bevölkerung 7 (2007): 1–2.
50. These targets were recently lowered from the previous requirement to create ten jobs and invest one million euros; see Jan Schneider, “Novellierung des Zuwanderungsrechts,” Migration und Bevölkerung 6 (2007): 1–2.
51. In August 2008, this amount was lowered from 85,000 euros due to the low number of immigrants who entered Germany: Bundesregierung, “Guter Start für helle Köpfe” (Bonn, August 27, 2008); bundesregierung.de, accessed August 8, 2008.
57. I am grateful to Daniela Steggemann, Carmen Grote, and Stefanie Fischer of the Koordinierungseinheit Arbeitsmarktzulassung at the Bundesarbeitsamt, who provided these figures.


62. Soysal, note 33.


64. E.g., Yuval-Davis, note 61.


